Abstract -Today it is very important to maintain an intermediary level of security to ensure safe and trusted communication for daily usage. Secured data communication over internet and any other network is hard to achieve due to the threat of intrusions and misuse. Unfortunately, none of the existing systems have proved to be flawless, though various approaches have been used to thwart network intrusion activities. This paper proposes an investigation Model for Identifying and Collecting Intrusion Evidences (MICIE). In particular, the proposed model MICIE comprises three main features, SNORT as IDS, MySQL as database and BASE for result viewing. These features were installed on Raspberry Pi, which was used to aid the data collection process. The results demonstrated that the proposed model is promising for identifying and collecting evidence of network intrusions in real time.
I. INTRODUCTION
In conjunction with an increasing number of Internet users worldwide, exposure to network intrusion activities has also increased [1] . As communities become more dependent on the online environment, the emergence of massive growth in malware activities all across the globe is predicted. There are multiple ways to access and exploit vulnerable systems, and yet users remain nonchalant. Increased awareness is needed to arouse cautiousness to recognise malware infections to defend personal systems from malicious software.
Scheduled system scanning is crucial for identifying weaknesses in network security for organizations. This halts progression from unknown users before an attack is initiated. The aim of running a vulnerability scanner or conducting an external vulnerability assessment is to diagnose devices on a user or corporate network, which are exposed to known vulnerabilities without compromising systems operations.
Although performing a vulnerability scan is an excellent start, the real dilemma emerges from how users should implement recovery actions once a network breach is detected. This is where risk-based management is helpful. It provides a system the ability to counteract threats imposed by real scenarios. It serves as a way to help communities discover and mitigate network weaknesses before they can be exploited.
Although several solutions have been proposed, identifying and collecting evidence of network intrusions still has several challenges. Handling large amounts of data from all of the connected devices in a network is difficult [2] [3] . Some traffic, especially malicious traffic, will exploit security loopholes to invade and sabotage an entire network. A lack of awareness among users about the importance of preventive measures on personal devices makes network systems vulnerable against unauthorised access. Using only a firewall for network protection is not enough to prevent unauthorised access [4] . Network intrusion can happen at any time without being noticed by users. Thus, User systems will be defenceless against malicious threats if network security is implemented only at scheduled times. System resources are consumed when running network security software for long durations.
This study proposes an investigation Model for Identifying and Collecting Intrusion Evidences (MICIE). In particular, the proposed model MICIE focuses on analysing the behaviour of network intrusion activities using experiments, to pinpoint network security breaches and to fortify systems against unauthorized access. MICIE critically reviews existing loopholes within household and organization network security to identify network intrusion behaviour. Another objective for MICIE is to investigate suitable methodology for improving existing network security software against malicious network. To implement MICIE, an experiment involving the use of a rule-based approach and a Raspberry Pi model as a honeypot system to aid data collection was conducted. Rule-based statements were executed to identify malicious activities. These activities were logged in the database. From the collected information, users observe trends and activity rates for intrusion activities by viewing statistical reports. This allows defences to be made before an attack is initiated. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides related works. Section 3 describes MICIE architecture. An implementation of MICIE is described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the obtained results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The massive growth of the Internet offers improvements for data coordination and transmission, especially as accessibility to enormous data storage increases. This phenomenon has exposed users to numerous vulnerabilities too in accordance to this network expansion. Networks could be compromised and fall to malevolent scams without users realising it. Hackers' intention is to get financial benefits through their malicious plots from a large pool of compromised hosts. This horrifying threat is worsened with the appearance of botnets, which propagate in the manner of internet worms, remaining hidden within the victim systems
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A few studies have been conducted on the methodological analysis of bots and botnets such as their behaviours, statistics, and traffic measurements. A study conducted by Hyunsang, Choi [5] from Korea University addresses limitations in current botnet detection by monitoring group activities with surveillance traffic. They proposed their own botnet DNS query detection algorithm, which was composed of different features of botnet DNS. They constructed a multifaceted environment with over 50 machines as a testbed using campus networks to verify the algorithms with real-time scenarios such as e-mail spamming and DDoS attacks. Their algorithms were further supported by statistics generated from botnet DNS query detection and migrating botnet detection. The patterns for intended intrusion attacks were observed and analysed to enhance existing countermeasures to botnets, which has become an epidemic of unwanted network traffic. Jadidoleslamy H. [6] depicted a comprehensive view design by showcasing a complete and comprehensive Intrusion Detection Architecture (IDA). It was said that hierarchical structures contributes most of the architecture. For instance, it was designed to be applicable in one or two levels, maintaining consistency in the application domains and prerequisite security level. This study was further supported by a relative questionnaire, comprising the different properties for IDA. Discussion on the high level and general requirements of IDS were carried out, primarily focused on IDS performance and functionalities.
Another experiment was coordinated by Gurpreet Kaur and Rshma Chawla [7] to explore anomaly-based intrusion detection systems in data collection for analysis. It highlighted characteristics and effects from clustering Wireless Sensor Networks to exemplify limitations in a monitored environment. They proposed an anomaly-based intrusion detection system, which is pragmatic and unique, implemented using clustered wireless sensor network with access control mechanisms. The simulation integrated the following components, monitor, misuse detector, anomaly detector, inference module, reaction module, security, and signature database, which further solidified their predictions and assumptions regarding network intrusion.
A. Intrusion Detection Architectural Model
This is an overview of components in an intrusion detection system environment. First is data collection, followed by feature selection, signatures analysis, and action/reflex against detected threats. Fig. 1 shows the main functions of the intrusion detection system.
1) Data collection:
This module acts as the initial phase for intrusion detection system. It automatically captures and passes relative data from the monitored system to neighbouring modules for further operations. The collected data was mostly sent to a designated file before being analysed. 2) Feature Selection: User actions are dynamically monitored once they are logged into the system. This phase sorts out distinct features in the large amounts of data captured from the network. This helps evaluate intrusion activities. For example, the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the source and target system, protocol type, header length and size are used as a key for intrusion [8] . Thus, users must deploy a set of rules for governing alerts to reduce false positive and false negative response. Fig. 2 illustrates the general process of anomaly features selection. 
3) Analysis phase:
The collected data is analyzed to find suspicious threats. Profiling and pattern recognition techniques are used to analyze the collected data for presentation to an intrusion detection system [9] . Captured activities which significantly deviate from the applied rules are referred to as anomalous behavior and flagged as potential intrusions.
4) Action/reflex against threat:
This is where the intrusion detection system responsive mechanism is implied. It is resolved in two ways, either by sending an alert to a system administrator with data evidence or by directly imposing action against a detected threat. For example, by selectively dropping packets to prevent system penetration or closing a vulnerable targeted port.
B. Methodology of Intrusion Detection System
Due to immense network vulnerabilities, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have become an asset in securing data integrity and confidentiality. They are designated to monitor, analyse, and respond to certain security violations against computer and network systems in real time. These violations result from break-in attempts by unauthorized intruders, either remotely or internally, who intend to compromise a system for personal gain. This can be Regardless of the evolution of the intrusion detection field, the underlying methodologies should not be treated lightly as they hold the keys to maintaining and improving efficiency intrusion detection systems. The use of suitable methodologies within intrusion detection systems to handle different situations must be practised in order to achieve optimal performance. There are currently three major intrusion detection system methodologies: Anomaly Based Methodology, Signature Based Methodology, and Stateful Protocol Analysis Based Methodology.
1) Anomaly Based Methodology:
This methodology works by comparing probed activities against a baseline profile [1] . The baseline profile was developed during a learning period where the intrusion detection system learns about the environment and creates a normal profile of the monitored system, which can be networks, users and other systems. The profile can be fixed or dynamic. Zero-day attacks to this environment can be detected without any system updates. Fig. 3 illustrates the general diagram for an Anomaly-based protocol. Three general techniques for detecting anomalies are used, anomaly detection, knowledge/data-mining, and machine learning based. Statistical anomaly techniques are meant to build two required profiles, one during the learning phase which is used as the baseline profile and the current profile which is compared to the baseline profile. Any differences that are found are marked as anomalies depending on the threshold settings of the monitored environment [10] [11] . The knowledge/data-mining technique automates anomaly searches. This causes high system overheard and degrades overall system efficiency. The machine learning technique works by analysing the system for normal system behaviour and suspicious activities. It is given tasks to audit records in order to determine feature definitions for generating intrusion detection rules.
2) Signature-Based Methodology: Signature-based methodology works by comparing observed signatures to signatures stored in a database or a list of known attack signatures [12] . It works in a similar way to a virus scanner.
Any signature observed in the monitored environment that matches signatures on file is deemed as a violation of the security policy or as an attack. This implementation involves less system overhead due to the fact that it does not inspect every single activity or all network traffic in the monitored environment. It only searches for known signatures stored in a database or file. Compared to the anomaly based methodology, the signature based methodology system is easy to deploy since it does not require prior learning in the working environment. This methodology works by circulating the process of search, inspection, and comparison of captured network packets for known threats signatures. Fig. 4 illustrates a general diagram for the Signature-based protocol. Signature based methodologies are effective for known attacks/violations. It cannot detect new attacks until it is updated with new signatures, which is time-consuming. It can be easily evaded since it is based on known attacks and depends on new signatures to be added before new attacks can be found.
3) Stateful Protocol Analysis Based Methodology:
The Stateful protocol analysis methodology works by comparing predefined profiles of how protocols should behave against observed behaviour to identify deviations [13] . Fig. 5 illustrates a general diagram of a Stateful protocol. Vendors are responsible for designing and establishing protocol profiles. It explores the interactive behaviour between protocols and applications. It differs from the signature based methodology, which only compares observed behaviour based on a given list. This approach for understanding/analysing behaviour has high system overhead and degrades performance. It attributes in analysis for understanding how a protocol should behave serves as a base for developing an intrusion detection system which understands web traffic behaviour. It is more effective for websites protection. Although it understands monitored protocols, it can still be easily evaded by attacks that follow acceptable behaviour. It operates based on protocol standards from software vendors and renowned standard bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Request for Comments (RFC). Differences do apply in protocol implementation. Protocol models typically take this factor into account during implementation. This creates confusion as many standards do explain protocol details. As a result, causes variations between the implementation of the same standard do occur.
C. Methodologies Comparison
The three methodologies discussed above were evaluated based on the following criteria, high accuracy rate in intrusion detection, overall performance against security threats, protection against new attacks, overhead on monitored systems, and scheduled maintenance [14] .
1) High accuracy rate:
This feature is essential for detecting and analysing possible threats against monitored systems. Although the rating for all methodologies falls under the same category, anomaly-based methodology outweighs the others as it can detect previously known threats. Unlike signature-based methodology, which refers to a known threat, signature and stateful protocol analysis is based on a userdefined rule list. Both of these methodologies have limitations when addressing new threats.
2) Performance: It is crucial to perform at peak performance under any circumstances without bottlenecks or reduced system efficiency. The signature and stateful protocol analysis based methodologies offers better performance than anomaly-based methodologies since they only check for welldefined signatures from vendors, which may require minimal resource usage. Anomaly-based methodology uses tedious data-mining processes to identify and categorise foreseen events.
3) Protection against new attacks: Anomaly-based methodology detects new attacks without updates by referring to both fixed and dynamic profiles, unlike the signature-based and stateful protocol analysis, which require their signatures databases to be updated before they can detect previously unknown threats. This procedure may take up to one week, depending on the complexity/severity of the threat, if the system is already infiltrated without information on the origins of the threat.
4) Overhead on Monitored System: Due to its complicated tasks and vast area covered in the intrusion detection phase, the anomaly-based methodology places the most overhead on a targeted system, followed by signaturebased and stateful protocol analysis. The least overhead is exerted on the system by both signature-based and stateful protocol analysis due to the fact that less resource is consumed for operations handling intrusion detection.
5) Maintenance:
Anomaly-based methodology requires less maintenance than the other methods. Anomaly-based methodology does not involve updates to initiate the identification of new threats. The other methodologies require constant signature updates to keep track of new security defects. Additional update for signatures or resource is required to maintain methodology flow. Table 1 summarizes a comparison between the three IDS methodologies as stated in [14] .
TABLE I EVALUATION OF IDS METHODOLOGIES
Each methodology has its own advantages and disadvantages. For dealing with real-time threats, the appropriate use of suitable methodology is the best way in counteracting security threats by fortifying the monitored system as well as optimizing performance to reduce unauthorized intrusions.
III. PROPOSED MODEL MICIE
Design is how all requirements are turned into detailed specifications. This testifies the feasibility of the proposed system against malicious activities. Fig. 6 is a blueprint for how the MICIE was designed and constructed. It encompasses the steps needed to construct the proposed system, such as the installation of related software, graphical display tools for report viewing and a secure database to safeguard generated log files. In total, MICIE has six phases, which are data collection, detection, investigation, reporting, evidence collection, and maintenance. For data collection, Raspberry Pi was used as a decoy to capture network traffic. It acts as a victim in a real scenario. Next is the detection phase where captured network data is filtered using rule-based statements implemented in the system, such as comparing the source and destination IP addresses as well as ports to defined rules. If these match, it notifies users about intrusion activities and also logs these activities into a database, which triggers the investigation phase to observe network intrusion behavior such as activity rates for given intrusion activities.
The evidence collection phase works concurrently with the maintenance phase. The evidence collection phase involves the storage of log files for malicious activities inside a database. The maintenance phase involves installing new rules to detect new threat based on the collected log files.
Experiments are conducted to further understand whether log activities are malicious before new rules are installed to increase the efficiency of the rule-based system. The log files are viewed in a graphical format such as a bar chart. This is where the reporting phase takes place. From the statistical report, users are able to foresee and predict upcoming attacks before they occur.
The flowchart shown in Fig. 7 depicts the general operations of MICIE which aids in the study of network intrusion behavior and security patterns/events. This gives an overview about the objectives of this research study and information on the implementation of MICIE. This diagram is a workflow of stepwise actions. First, users access the system and run SNORT software by powering up the Raspberry Pi, which is used as a decoy for surveillance purposes. Next, SNORT will monitor for activities that are deemed harmful or suspicious in the network. The captured network traffic is compared with rule-based statements to detect anomalous activities. If a threat is detected, it will log the event and save it to the database. This includes which port the attack went through, a timestamp for its occurrence and the alarms engaged. The results are viewed on the web via Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE) [15] to observe attack patterns in a graphical format such as a bar chart.
MICIE model undergoes further analysis to determine whether or not an attack is a new threat. New rules are created to detect the new threat whenever it resurfaces in the monitored system. This helps predict future attacks by taking into account the timestamp and the targeted port number in the network environment.
IV. MICIE IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed model MICIE was implemented by using Raspberry Pi and the operating system was Raspbian. Building the system involved installation, setting and configuration through command line instructions. The MICIE model consists of three main components, which are SNORT as the IDS, MySQL as the database for stored alarm data and BASE as the graphical interface. Table 2 displays additional information for the FTP anonymous login scan logged inside the MySQL database, which is viewed using BASE. This includes the timestamp, source IP address, targeted port, signature, and the layer protocol involved for the penetration testing activities.
A. Network monitoring:
The MICIE model was tested for network monitoring from 19
th September 2016 to 28 th September, 2016. The results are shown in Fig. 9 using the graph alert detection time option from BASE. Based on the graph, Snort succeeded in logging data from the monitored network for 10 days. The alert appeared to fluctuate, with 1210 alerts generated in total. Based on the 1210 alerts generated using the MICIE model, the logged activities were classified into 3 main categories, which are TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic protocols. As shown in Fig. 10 , the TCP category accounted for the highest number of alerts with 56% or 678 alerts. TCP related activities include HTTP brute force tests, FTP anonymous login scans, IP fragmentation attacks, DoS attacks, and NMap flags can (ACK, NULL, XMAS, and FIN). For UDP and ICMP, both categories occupied 28% and 16% of the 1210 generated alerts, respectively.
B. Analysis for Identifying "Attacker"
Analysis of the collected data was done to seek repeated evidence that can be used to determine the real "attacker". For example, the appearance of certain IP addresses during specific periods of time. Table 3 showed a list of source IP addresses where intrusion activities originated. th September 2016 By referring to the given traits, the scope for identifying the attackers is narrowed down. It shortens the time required to find the real culprit as more evidence is available based on the specific behaviour found in data analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes MICIE model for identifying and collecting network intrusion events at real time. MICIE aims to mitigate the difficulty of identifying and collecting intrusion evidences and lessens the impact of network intrusion behaviour circulating a network. New rules were updated in the rule set to identify and take action against a newlydiscovered threat. It is presumed that prevention, detection, and response are the fundamental components of network security as they serve as the prerequisites for effective security programs. The obtained result demonstrates that MICIE is promising in identifying the possible evidences that can be used to detect and prevent network intrusion at real time.
Future work for this study can be done in the detection phase. The evidence identified and collected by this model was analyzed to detect attack activates and identify the attacker who launched an attack. 
